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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NANCY SCHNEIDER LOGAN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent,; 
vs. Case No. 16557 
EDWARD JAMES SCHNEIDER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is on appeal by the Defendant-Appellant from 
an Order of the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for 
Millard County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Harlan Burns 
presiding, denying Defendant-Appellant's Motion To Stay 
Entry Of Judgment granting full faith and credit to a Judg-
ment of the State of Ohio. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff-Respondent commenced this action in the lower 
Court to enforce in the State of Utah a Judgment originally 
granted in the State of Ohio. Plaintiff-Respondent filed a 
Motion For Summary Judgment which was granted. Defendant-
Appellant thereafter filed a Motion To Stay the Entry of 
Judgment pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and also requested that the lower Court hear oral argument 
with respect to Plaintiff-Respondent's Motion For Summary 
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Judgment. Said Motion To Stay the Entry of Judgment was 
orally argued to the lower Court. The lower Court denied 
Defendant-Appellant's Motion, prompting this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have this Honorable Supreme 
Court affirm the order of the lower Court denying Defendant-
Appellant's Motion To Stay The Entry Of Judgment and, fur-
ther to affirm the Judgment of the lower Court giving full 
faith and credit to the Judgment of the State of Ohio. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Respondent agrees with Defendant-Appellant's 
Statement of Facts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF OHIO HAD JURISDIC-
TION OVER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AT ALL STATES OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
Throughout this Brief references will be made to various 
Exhibits. All said Exhibits are attached to the Memorandum 
In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment on file herein. 
The Ohio Courts obtained jurisdiction over the person 
of Defendant-Appellant for the original 1961 court action to 
obtain child support by personal service upon the Defendant-
Appellant. Exhibit 4 shows the Motion for child support, 
duly signed by Plaintiff-Respondent and Exhibit 5 shows per-
sonal service of said Motion upon Defendant-Appellant. Exhibit 
6 is the order of the Ohio Courts granting the original child 
support order for 1961. 
-2-
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Of particular significance in Exhibit 6 is the last 
paragraph which provides: 
All matters with reference to the custody 
of said minor child, the support and visit-
ation of said minor child, shall be subject 
to the continuing jurisdiction of this court. 
(emphasis added) 
In 1967 Plaintiff-Respondent, through her attorney, 
filed a Motion to reduce unpaid child support to Judgment. 
See Exhibit 7 for said copy of said Motion. Said Motion 
was personally served upon Defendant-Appellant by the Sher-
iff's Office of Orange County, California, thereby giving 
Defendant-Appellant notice of the action. See Exhibit 8 
for Sheriff's Return of Service. (The adequacy of the 
notice is addressed in Point II, infra.) From the above, 
it can be seen that the Ohio Court had continuing juris-
diction over Defendant-Appellant for its action in 1967. 
Defendant-Appellant, at page 9 of his Brief, states 
that Exhibit 8, Sheriff's Return of Service is defective 
because it does not say what document was served upon 
Defendant-Appellant. Defendant-Appellant should not now 
be allowed to raise a doubt as to whether Exhibit 8 is in-
valid for the above reason because he failed to file any 
Affidavits claiming that the document was not served upon 
him at the time the Motion For Summary Judgment was ruled 
upon. 
In 1975, Plaintiff-Respondent filed a Motion with 
the Ohio Court asking for an increase in the amount of child 
~upport and for a Judgm~nt on the amount of the arreage of 
child support. See Exhibit 10 for a copy of said Motion 
-3-
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and Exhibit 11 for a notice of hearing of said Motion. Def-
endant-Appellant, in response thereto, made a general appear-
ance by filing his Declaration of Edward James Schneider, 
Exhibit 12. 
The Declaration Of Edward James Schneider (Exhibit 
12) cures any and all defects in jurisdiction that may have 
occured up to the 1975 Ohio Court action. In Barber v. 
Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah, 1974) this Court held that an 
appearance by a Defendant for any purpose other than to ob-
ject to jurisdiction, constitutes a general apperance. Since 
Defendant-Appellant, by his Declaration, did not object to 
jurisdiction, his action constituted a general appearance. 
In Coleman v. M~, 493 P.2d 48 (Oregon,l972}, the 
Oregon Supremr Court ruled that a party waives all irregular-
ities in service of process, whether it be before or after 
Judgment, when he makes a general appearance. Since Defendant-
Appellant made a general appearance through his Declaration 
he waived any irregularities in jurisdiction that may have 
existed up to that time. 
From the above outline of the events in this matter, 
it can be seen that the Ohio Court had jurisdiction over 
Defendant at each and every stage of the proceedings and that 
any alleged defect in jurisdiction was cured by the general 
appearance of Defendant-Appellant by his Declaration (Ex-
hibit 12). Therefore, this Court is urged to rule that the 
Ohio Court had jurisdiction over the person of Defendant-
Appellant. 
-4-
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POINT II: DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAD SUFFICIENT NOTICE 
OF ALL PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT IN OHIO. 
Defendant-Appellant contends that he did not receive 
sufficient notice of the 1967 Court action whereby a Judg-
ment was granted against him for child support arreages. 
As outlined in Point I, Plaintiff-Respondent filed 
a motion in 1967 to reduce delinquent child support to 
Judgment. (Exhibit 7) Said Motion was personally served 
upon the Defendant-Appellant on October 3, 1967. (Exhibit 
8). The Motion provided the following material factc to 
Defendant-Appellant, namely, the amount of the weekly child 
support obligation, the claimed current amount of the de-
linquency and a request that said amount be reduced to 
Judgment. About two months after service of the Motion upon 
Defendant, on December 1, 1967, the Ohio Court entered its 
Judgment. (Exhibit 9). 
Both the United States Constitution, 14th Amendment, 
and the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7, provide 
that "no person shall be deprived of 1 ife, 1 iberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law". As applied to this 
case, the due process clause requires that Defendant-Appel-
lant be provided with sufficient notice of the Court pro-
ceedings. 
The required nature of the notice, to satisfy due 
process requirements, is set forth in 16 Am Jur 2d Consti-
tutional Law, § 562: 
To meetthe requirements of due process, 
the notice ~ust be reasonable and adequate 
-5-
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for the purpose, due regard being had to the 
nature of the proceedings and the character 
of the rights which may be affected by it. 
It must give sufficient notice of the pendency 
of the action or proceeding and a reasonable 
opportunity to a defendant to appear and as-
sert his rights before a tribunal legally 
constituted to adjudicate such rights ... 
The fundamental test is whether the notice is 
fair and just to the parties involved. The 
adequacy of notice respecting proceedings 
that may affect a party's rights turns, to a 
considerable extent, on the knowledge which 
the circumstances show such party may be as-
sumed to have with respect to the consequences 
of his own conduct. (emphasis added) 
In Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64,67 (Utah, 1978), 
this Court ruled that ''implied in the due process clause of 
our State Constitution is that persons be afforded a hearing 
to determine their rights under the law". In Watson vs. 
Washington Preferred Life Insurance Co., 502 P.2d 1016 (Wash., 
1972), the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the essence 
of procedural due process is notice and the right to be heard, 
and that the notice must be reasonably calculated to apprise 
a party of the pendency of the proceedings. 
From the above, the two required elements of notice 
for due process requirements appear. First, notice of the 
pendency of the action and second, reasonable opportunity 
to appear and assert his rights. 
Defendant-Appellant was given notice of the action 
by the Motion (Exhibit 7) which was served upon him. Defen-
dant-Appellant was notified that Plaintiff-Respondent was 
seeking a Judgment against him for an amount listed on the 
Motion represented to be delinquent child support payments. 
We can also assume that Defendant knew he was in default on 
his child support payments and therefore had this additional 
-5-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and T chnology Act, administ red by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
notice of the proceedings. Defendant was also given a rea-
sonable opportunity to appear and assert his rights because 
no action was taken upon the Motion until December l, 1967, 
almost two months after the Motion was served upon the 
Defendant-Appellant. Because of this delay in obtaining 
the 1967 Judgment, Defendant-Appellant can hardly claim 
he was not afforded an opportunity to appear in the case. 
Defendant-Appellant, at page 9 of his brief, quotes 
Revised Code Ohio Section 2309.67 for the proposition that 
notice should have been given to Defendant-Appellant of 
time, place, etc. of any court hearing. However, this 
section begins "When notice of a motion is required", there-
by implying that in Ohio there may be some motions without 
notice. However, any alleged violation of the Ohio law of 
notice would seem to be immaterial since the issue on appeal 
is not whether the Ohio law of notice was satisfied, but 
rather was due process requirements of notice satisfied. 
In Transamerican Title Insurance Co. v. United Resources 
~. 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (1970) this Court held 
that an irregularity of procedure not constituting due 
process may be asserted as a defense for an action on a for-
eign judgment if properly raised. That case does not allow 
an alleged violation of State Law not constituting a violation 
of due process to be raised as a defense. Furthermore, 
Defendant.-Appellant has waived any defect of notice based 
on Ohio Statutory Law for the 1967 hearing because he made 
a general appearance by his Declaration Of Edward James 
-7-
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Schneider, (Exhibit 12) in 1975 and failed to object to the 
notice given him in 1967. Therefore, it is argued that 
Defendant-Appellant had notice of the 1967 Court action 
sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. 
POINT III: THE UTAH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT 
PROHIBIT ENFORCEMENT OF THE OHIO JUDGMENT. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-22 provides: 
Within eight years: An action upon a judgment 
or decree of any Court of the United States, 
or of any state or territory within the United 
States. 
Defendant-Appellant has argued that the above statute 
prohibits collection of that portion of the Judgment represen-
ted by the 1967 award. However, Defendant-Appellant is over-
looking the fact that a judgment can be renewed, thereby 
extending its life. This procedure is accepted in the State 
of Utah. See, for example, Yergensen v. Ford, 16 Utah 2d 
397, 402 P.2d 696 (1965) where renewal was denied because 
action for renewal was commenced 8 l/2 years after judgment 
was granted. 
By taking the 1975 Court action, Plaintiff-Respondent 
renewed the 1967 Judgment and said Judgment was merged into 
the 1975 Judgment. That this is the effect in the State of 
Ohio is apparent by reference to the Certificate of Judgment 
(Exhibit 14) which certifies that Judgment was rendered on 
June 13, 1975 for support arreage for $7,902.84 ($7,522.84, 
the amount of the renewed 1967 Judgn1ent as of May 3, 1975 
and $380.00 for arreages since 1967). From the above it 
-8-
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seems apparent that the effect of the 1975 Judgment was, in 
part, to renew the 1967 Judgment, thereby extending its life. 
vi des: 
Furthermore, Utah Code Annotated, ~ 78-12-35 pro-
If when a cause of action accrues aqainst a 
person when he is out of state, the- action 
may be commenced within the term herein lim-
ited after his return to the state; ... 
In Defendant-Appellant's Written Answers To Inter-
rogatories, the Defendant-Appellant states that he became 
a resident of this State on May 6, 1977 and has since been 
out-of-state for approximately 4 l/2 months. 
Plaintiff-Respondent's, "cause of action", namely 
the right to collect upon the Judgment, accrued while Defen-
dant-Appellant resided outside the State of Utah. Therefore, 
the above provision tolls the running of the Statute of 
limitations and allows Plaintiff-Respondent to commence her 
action against Defendant-Appellant "within the term herein 
limited after his return to the state". Specifically, the 
eight year limitation period did not commence until such 
time as Def~njant became a resident of the State of Utah, 
in this case on May 6, 1977. 
The uefendant cites Revised Code Ohio Section 2305.07 
for the proposition that it establishes a six year statute 
of limitatio~s for child s~pport arrearages. This is not 
the case. ihe Ohio Courts rave held that Statutes of Limit-
ation of the State do not apply to alimony and support pay-
mer, t s . Q_e C 1m f' _'/__-_Be a!:.i, 9 4 0 h i o A p p . 3 6 7 ( 1 9 53 ) and L em e r t 
v. Lemert, 72 Ohio St. 364, 74 N.E. 194 (1905). 
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For the above reasons, the Court is urged to rule 
that the eight year Statute of Limitations period imposed by 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-22, does not prohibit en-
forcement of the Ohio Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Ohio Court obtained jurisdiction over Defendant-
Appellant for any and all action taken by that Court. Said 
jurisdiction was obtained by personal service upon the Def-
endant-Appellant at every stage of the proceedings. Defendant-
Appellant also received notice of the 1967 Court action suf-
ficient to satisfy due process requirements. The Defendant-
Appellant was notified of the nature of the proceedinqs and 
was given sufficient time (2 months) to appear and assert 
his rights. 
The eight year Statute of Limitations of this State 
is not applicable to this case because Plaintiff-Respondent 
renewed the 1967 Judgment in 1975 and, furthermore, because 
Defendant-Appellant resided outside of this State until May 
6, 1977, thereby tolling the running of the Statute of Limit-
ation until that date. 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm 
the ruling of the lower Court. 
Respectfully submitted this i7th day of September, 1979. 
~f~~~1:,,doc.t 
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